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Legal and economic aspects of best execution in the context
of the Markets in Financial Instruments Directive (MiFID)
Abstract
This paper explores the implications for investment firms and clients that arise out of an interpretation of
the Market in Financial Instruments Directive (MiFID) best execution requirements from a law and
economics perspective. While best execution is often framed as a matter of investor protection, research
on market microstructure suggests that there is, in fact, an efficiency rationale (and not only a
distributional rationale) for having some degree of best execution regulation. In terms of the specific
rules of MiFID, the analysis reveals that an investment firm's best execution policy will play a central
role. MiFID's best execution concept is process- based, ie investment firms need to show that they took
measures leading to best execution in expectation; actual best execution is not required. The paper also
discusses current issues such as the form of the execution policy and the appropriate number of
execution venues. 
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A. Introduction
The Markets in Financial Instruments Directive (MiFID)1
will, for the first time, introduce unified requirements for the
best execution of client orders in financial instruments in
Europe. The concept of best execution itself is not new; on
the contrary, it is one of the essential features in a prin-
cipal–agent relationship such as that between an investor and
his broker. What is new, however, is that the European
Union has agreed to implement a legal context under which
best execution is regulated in a common framework. Best
execution is one of the central pillars of the MiFID and, as
such, it holds numerous conceptual and practical challenges.
Some estimate that the cost of MiFID could reach as much
as €9bn over the coming years.2
In this paper, we explore the practical implications for
investment firms and clients that arise out of an interpreta-
tion of best execution requirements from a law and
economics perspective. Investment firms throughout the
EU – as well as in countries that have a close relationship
with the EU such as Switzerland – are working to adjust
their internal procedures to the requirements of the new
directive. The purpose of this article is to provide a general
background against which these attempts should be evalu-
ated as well as practical guidance for investment firms in
their endeavours.
We begin in Section B by describing the current frame-
work of rules of best execution, ie the governing regulation
before the MiFID was implemented, and juxtaposing it with
the new MiFID rules. The central insight one obtains from
comparing various existing rules is that MiFID brings a
substantial change in the meaning of best execution for
many European countries. Only a third of EU countries had
a generalised best execution duty as envisioned by the
MiFID; two-thirds concentrated on more specific criteria
such as price.
To understand how to interpret those terms which
necessarily remain imprecisely defined in MiFID, it is essen-
tial to have a sound understanding of the economic
principles underlying the notion of best execution. There-
fore, Section C motivates the need for best execution
regulation, both in individual countries as well as across the
European Union. The guiding principle that emerges is that
best execution regulation should be understood to aim at
minimising total transaction costs. This, in turn, allows more
efficient interactions, leading to greater liquidity, market effi-
ciency and, ultimately, greater allocative efficiency.
Section D then turns to the actual rules contained in
MiFID. We find that they match well with the conceptual
ideas of the economics of best execution discussed in
Section C. Further we elaborate on the question of how
investor protection and market efficiency are related and
how potential conflicts between the two can be resolved.
Section E discusses how investment firms are to satisfy
the best execution requirements in practice. A central point
is that MiFID is a process-based set of requirements. This
means that rather than actually providing best execution in
each and every specific case, investment firms have a primary
responsibility to have the proper policies and behaviours in
place that in principle allow best execution to be achieved.
We discuss special issues such as client instructions, number
of execution venues, dealing on own accounts, and the
format and content of execution policies.
Section F presents the planned next steps in implementa-
tion in EU Member States.
Section G addresses the issue of how firms that are active
in the EU and in non-Member States need to approach best
execution. In particular, we consider the case of Switzerland
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and the United States. While Switzerland knows a general-
ised best execution requirement, the US regulation currently
is focused primarily on price and cost as the central criteria.
Section H concludes with three major principles and a
concluding remark.
B. Current framework of rules of best execution
To set the stage for the analysis that follows, first the current
legal situation in Europe is briefly outlined.3
1. EU-level (Investment Services Directive)
The primary target of the Investment Services Directive
(ISD)4 was the procedure of admission and supervision of
investment firms to harmonise to a minimum, EU-wide
level.5
Although the ISD was wide-ranging in its scope, it did
not specifically discuss best execution, much less provide a
common definition or policy. Best execution would likely
fall within the scope of its Article 11:6
“Member States shall draw up rules of conduct which
investment firms shall observe at all times. Such rules
must implement at least the principles set out in the fol-
lowing indents and must be applied in such a way as to
take account of the professional nature of the person for
whom the service is provided. . . . These principles shall
ensure that an investment firm:
– acts honestly and fairly in conducting its business
activities in the best interests of its clients and the integ-
rity of the market,
– acts with due skill, care and diligence, in the best
interests of its clients and the integrity of the market . . .
."
Although a best execution rule may be implied from Article
11 ISD, the range of actual best execution policies imple-
mented in practice demonstrates that European countries
interpreted this concept quite broadly.7 Section B.2 provides
details.
2. European and other countries
As mentioned above, there has been no standard definition
of best execution in the European Union, since there is no
single regulator to co-ordinate or direct changes to regula-
tion. Each country in Europe has (under ISD) operated its
own concept of best execution, making use of different
terms with differing emphasis and levels of specificity.8
Table 1 summarises the key phrases from several Euro-
pean regulators in respect of the rules relating to best
execution.9
Table 2 summarises the key phrases from other regulators
in respect of the rules relating to best execution.
Taking these rules together, the following facts become
apparent:
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Table 1
Austria “. . . at best price on the relevant market within a
reasonable period of time . . .”
Belgium “Orders must be executed as rapidly as possible and
at the best conditions.”
Denmark “. . . a securities dealer must always have a
universal obligation to ensure the customer the best
possible price.”
Finland “. . . shall execute . . . in the customer”s best
interest without undue delay.”
France “. . . ensure that its orders are executed in the best
manner possible.”
Germany “. . . to obtain the best price on the relevant
market . . .”
Greece “. . . within reasonable time period . . . firms will
seek the best price available . . .”
Ireland “. . . deal to the best advantage . . .”
Italy “. . . best possible conditions considering price paid,
received and other costs . . .”
Holland “. . . as fast as possible in the best possible manner.”
Norway “. . . the client shall be given the best price that the
firm considers . . .”
Portugal “Perform the transactions in the best conditions of
market feasibility.”
Spain “. . . in the best terms . . .”
Table 2
Singapore “. . . all reasonable steps . . . in accordance with the
instructions of clients and on the best available
terms.”a
Switzerland “. . . the orders of his customer are executed in the
best way possible . . .”b
USA “. . . reasonable diligence to ascertain the best
market . . .”c
aArt 5 para 2 Financial Advisers Act (Monetary Authority of
Singapore, ACT 43 OF 2001); see also Investment Management
Association of Singapore, Code of Ethics & Standards of
Professional Conduct, Art 3 para 3: “Members should execute
client orders on the best available terms, taking into account the
relevant market at the time for transactions of the kind and size
concerned.”
bArt 11 para 1(b) Swiss Federal Act on Stock Exchanges and
Securities Trading (SESTA)
.cNASD Rule 2320: “(a) In any transaction for or with a customer
or a customer of another broker-dealer, a member and persons
associated with a member shall use reasonable diligence to
ascertain the best market for the subject security and buy or sell in
such market so that the resultant price to the customer is as
favourable as possible under prevailing market conditions. Among
the factors that will be considered in determining whether a
member has used ‘reasonable diligence’ are: (1) the character of the
market for the security, eg price, volatility, relative liquidity, and
pressure on available communications; (2) the size and type of
transaction; (3) the number of markets checked; (4) access ability
of the quotation; and (5) the terms and conditions of the order
which result in the transaction, as communicated to the member
and persons associated with the member.”
. There is great heterogeneity in terms of the rules that
countries have implemented with respect to best execu-
tion.
. Eight out of the 15 surveyed countries (Finland, France,
Holland, Ireland, Portugal, Singapore, Spain and Switzer-
land) have a generalised best execution concept.
. Four out of 15 countries focus on price alone (Denmark,
Germany, Italy and Norway).
. The remaining three countries list price and execution
time as the relevant criteria (Austria, Belgium, Greece).
Regarding the application of Article 11 ISD and its transfor-
mation into national legislation, no coherent court practice
is known regarding these best execution rules.
The fact that Article 11 ISD was construed by the
Member States in very different ways leads to juridical inse-
curity and considerably higher costs for investment firms
and their customers involved.10 In 2001, the European
Parliament reported the defects of the current regulation in
Article 11 ISD. The Parliament found that the different way
of implementing Article 11 ISD in national laws led to over-
laps, to conflicts in the national legislation and finally to
juridical insecurity. The reasons for these problems are the
interpretation and conversion difficulties, which result from
the current wording. In particular, the rules for monitoring
of the best execution obligation led to misunderstandings.
Another problem is that national legislation usually does not
differ between private and professional investors (according
to the idea of ISD, retail investors need more protection than
professional investors). To eliminate these problems, the
Parliament suggested adjustments and asked the Commission
to discuss a proposal for a better regulation.11
Given the fact that the MiFID introduces a generalised
notion of best execution, the changes brought about by
MiFID can be therefore dramatic for some countries. Since
it is not yet known how countries will precisely implement
(and goldplate) MiFID individually, this paper assumes that
the best execution guidelines will be implemented as MiFID
proposes.
C. The economics of best execution
To understand how any regulation of best execution (and
MiFID in particular) is interpreted, it is necessary to under-
stand what the purpose of rules requiring “best execution” is
in the first place. The starting point is the idea that clients
would like their brokers and the brokers’ dealers to most
closely replicate their will in executing their orders. Thus,
best execution is welfare-maximising execution, where the
interest of clients may involve any number of inputs,
including price, cost, speed and likelihood of execution,
etc.12
The chain of execution can take various forms. The
Committee of European Securities Regulators has discussed
a number of possible chains of execution.13 The basic
arrangement is one where a firm exercises full control over
how its client orders are executed (including, but not limited
to, the venue selection), perhaps doing this on a case-by-case
basis. For other types of trading, a firm creates trading stra-
tegies (including venue selection) for particular order categ-
ories. A third chain of execution involves a firm arranging
for the execution of client orders indirectly via one or more
intermediaries. This may still imply a significant degree of
control on the part of the firm, because the firm may
instruct the intermediary to use a specific execution venue.
A fourth common setup involves the firm receiving the
client order delegating control over the trading process to
another execution intermediary. There are other approaches
as well. All of these approaches fall under the category of
agency trading. This method has the advantage of relatively
low fees, but the implicit market risk costs fall to the
investor.14
To evaluate various ways of regulating best execution, a
useful benchmark to keep in mind is the following: suppose
that regulations designed to make the common market in
Europe more competitive actually achieve this goal. That is,
consider a perfectly competitive market. Then, the way best
execution is regulated will not, in the end, affect net trans-
action costs for market orders. To see why, note that if
brokers (or regulators) demand that dealers provide higher
execution quality, retail commissions will rise (and/or ancil-
lary services will fall). In other words, there is a trade-off
between execution quality and the price and level of broker-
age services.15
However, in the real world, markets are not perfectly
competitive. In particular, the relationship between traders
and their brokers is a principal–agent relationship, ie a
relationship characterised by diverging interests and, impor-
tantly, asymmetric information. A broker does not have the
same interests as his client; on the contrary, while the client
wants him to spend more effort finding better execution
venues, the broker wants to minimise these search efforts,
but the client cannot perfectly monitor these efforts. What
results is a moral hazard problem, especially in illiquid
markets. In addition, brokers possess private information
about market situations that are not easily available to their
principals, leading to a situation of adverse selection.
Because of both versions of the principal–agent problem,
efficiency losses may arise. It is worthwhile noting that
society at large – and not only specific investors – therefore
suffer from poor execution standards. This is particularly
obvious when one considers that economic agents do not
know for sure on which side of a transaction they will be in
the future, ie they are behind a veil of ignorance in that
respect. Even that is not enough to lead to the conclusion
that regulation is required, though. After all, although this
conclusion seems merited in a static context, a dynamic
perspective may imply a different outcome. In particular, one
could argue that poorly executing brokers will die out
anyway. Thus, customers looking out for their own interests
would reward good brokers and punish bad brokers, leading
to improved execution quality over time.
Still, there is a consensus – correctly, in our view – that
market discipline alone is not sufficient if it is not accom-
panied by at least a basic, flexible type of regulation. The
reason for this is simple. Market discipline only works if
customers can in fact cheaply audit the quality of execution.
More precisely, competitive market forces will induce
brokers to supply exactly those services that customers can
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easily audit. A central problem of any market discipline
argument (also in other contexts) is that “you can’t buy what
you can’t see”.16 Thus, suppliers who offer expensive quality
that buyers cannot recognise can be undercut by those who
claim to do so but do not. Most customers probably give
more weight to their visible commission costs than to their
less obvious built-in transaction costs. Thus, brokerages
prefer low commission to good executions, because low
commissions encourage customers to trade. More generally,
investment managers and traders tend to focus on explicit
transaction costs (broker commissions, exchange fees, taxes
and stamp duties), while awareness of implicit costs such as
bid–ask spread, market impact and especially operational
opportunity costs, timing opportunity costs and missed trade
opportunity costs tends to be much lower, even though
impact on overall success may be much higher.17 Explicit
costs have come down over the last decades (especially in the
United States),18 while implicit transaction costs have
remained fairly constant (with significant volatility). There is,
however, wide international variation.19
The only way to measure total execution price quality is
to compare actual execution prices with simultaneous trade
prices and quotes, factoring in explicit and implicit
transaction costs. Few retail traders have access to the
transaction and quote records surrounding their trades. The
process of comparing actual and potential prices is also time
consuming: for an individual, the resulting information is
quite costly relative to its value. For limit orders (which are
advocated by virtually all trading handbooks for retail
traders), verifying execution quality is even trickier. For
example, how can a customer determine whether a limit
order should have been executed. Finally, even if traders
measure execution quality, what is the standard against
which they measure it? One possibility is to trade with
multiple brokerages to establish standards and use relative
performance evaluation, but this takes time and effort.
All of this implies that market discipline alone is unlikely
to be sufficient to eliminate less-than-optimal execution. In
addition to the notion that individual efficiency losses are
neither bounded by nor eliminated by long-term market
discipline, a second insight is also relevant for best execution:
efficiency losses due to asymmetric information are not
restricted to individual agents. Rather, they add up and,
indeed, can multiply. In particular, welfare will suffer when
there is an externality in addition to the presence of
asymmetric information. If two principals do not get best
execution in buying and selling securities, this negatively
effects market efficiency and liquidity, which in turn limits
the efficiency-enhancing role of financial markets. Because
liquidity and market efficiency are inextricably linked,20 and
market efficiency is a necessary precondition for achieving
allocative efficiency, it is appropriate to direct significant
effort at the question of how to ensure minimal transaction
costs on financial markets.21 In short, we can think of legal
rules addressing the client–broker relationship as ways by
which economic agents aim to encourage transactions by
economising on transaction costs.22
Because best execution rules are, therefore, in the public
interest, it seems plausible that some sort of regulatory
involvement can lead to welfare improvements. On a general
level, economists have provided a number of conditions
under which there is scope for welfare-improving restric-
tions on private contracts.23 In particular, regulating private
contracts can be welfare enhancing if: (i) there is asymmetric
information between the parties at the time of contracting;24
(ii) the contract between the two parties has an externality
on a third party;25 or (iii) the courts can impose a remedy or
penalty not available to the parties privately.26
Our analysis in this section has shown that all three
conditions are fulfilled in the context of best execution:
brokers and dealers possess substantial asymmetric infor-
mation at the time a client submits an order; there are
potentially significant externalities on other market partici-
pants in terms of liquidity and market efficiency; and private
parties have difficulties (or lack of incentives) in obtaining
the information that would be required to measure best
execution and hold investment firms responsible.
In a nutshell, then, there is a sound economic argument
in favour of market-wide regulation of best execution.
Nonetheless, significant challenges exist in the step from this
general insight to an actual implementation of regulation
consistent with the insight. The next section demonstrates
how MiFID aims to address these challenges.
D. EU developments: the new best-execution
MiFID rules
1. Background for new rules
The new Directive on Markets in Financial Instruments was
developed against the backdrop of profound changes in the
capital market and supervisory structures that resulted in
recent years from the further development and diver-
sification of capital investment instruments, trading systems
and increased investor-protection requirements. As part of
the drive towards a truly common market, MiFID aims to
increase the level of transparency, the efficiency and liquidity
of European capital markets.27 The new rules of best
execution should also take defects of Article 11 ISD into
account.
From 1999 to 2005, the EU-wide overarching policy and
strategy in financial services and financial markets was
delivered in the framework of the Financial Services Action
Plan (FSAP). The Commission continues to regularly
monitor progress made in implementing the FSAP, for
instance through making twice-monthly updates to its FSAP
transposition tables. Work also continues on co-ordinating
the initiatives driven by the FSAP, including the restructured
financial services committee architecture (Lamfalussy ap-
proach), the Inter-institutional Monitoring Group and
supervisory convergence.28 The FSAP laid the foundations
for a strong financial market in the EU and has already
brought about many changes; MiFID is one example of the
efforts to complete the single market in financial services.
In the case of MiFID, the Lamfalussy approach has been
used; this aims at efficient adjustments and supervision
structure of the regulation as well as fast decision-making
and an appropriate standardisation of the supervision rules.29
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Under the Lamfalussy approach (applied to the securities
sector since 2002), framework Directives agreed by
co-decision – such as those on Market Abuse and on
Prospectuses – set out clear principles to be followed. They
also define the scope for technical implementing
instruments to be decided by the Commission, with the
assistance of the European Securities Committee (ESC)
made up of Member State representatives and taking into
account technical advice received from the Committee of
European Securities Regulators (CESR), composed of
national supervisory authorities. CESR also aims to ensure
the consistent implementation of EU securities law in the
Member States.30
2. A brief history of MiFID
In 2000, the Commission released a paper about the
application of conduct of business rules under Article 11
ISD and the experience of Member States in adopting
detailed national provisions implementing the general
principles of Article 11 ISD. They have introduced conduct
of business rules to protect consumers and investors which
cover also fair dealing requirements such as “best execu-
tion”.31 As shown above,32 the national rules are not unitary.
Member States differ in terms of the procedures used to give
effect to best execution. For example, Member States place
different emphasis on prevention of conflict of interest,
prohibition of activities such as churning, prescriptive rules
on order and time limits, allotment and information dis-
closure.33
In 2001, one core element of the preliminary con-
sultation of the revision of ISD was the modernisation and
harmonisation of the investor protection rules incumbent on
investment firms so as to ensure a high level of investor
protection and facilitate the cross-border provision of
investment services and to promote the integrity of the
market.34 In other words, best execution should be a
instrument to protect “public goods” and to establish clear
“lines in the sand” to protect investors.35
In 2002, the European Commission published a proposal
for the new Directive with the obligation for best execution
in Article 19.36 The Commission welcomed the European
Parliament backing for the proposed Directive in 2003 and
the released Council agreement37 makes majors steps toward
integrated EU equities markets.
In 2004, the European Parliament approved the proposed
Directive.38 Rules about best execution are found under
Article 21 with the title “Obligation to execute orders on
terms most favourable to the client.”39
In 2005, a proposal for a directive extending the trans-
position and application deadlines for MiFID was published.
This Directive40 finally was published in 2006.
In 2006, the Commission published the draft of the
Implementing Directive and consultation responses received
during public consultations in 2005 on DG Internal Market
Services’ working documents on the possible implementing
measures under MiFID.41 Finally, in September 2006, the
Implementing Regulation42 and Implementing Directive43
were published in the Official Journal.44
3. Main goals of best execution according to MiFID
MiFID’s perspective on best execution is generally consistent
with the economic interpretation of the best execution
principle that we gave above. In particular, MiFID speaks
both to the individual level and to the social (market) level.
(a) Favourable terms for clients and market efficiency
The main target of the new best execution rules under
MiFID is investor protection, as MiFID states itself in a
preliminary remark:
“It is necessary to impose an effective ‘best execution’
obligation to ensure that investment firms execute client
orders on terms that are most favorable to the client. This
obligation should apply to the firm which owes
contractual or agency obligations to the client.”45
As well as safeguarding investors’ interests, best execution
shall improve market efficiency by making sure the most
efficient trading arenas, with the lowest costs to the client,
are rewarded with more business.46 Article 21 MiFID also
references the “the fair and orderly functioning of
markets”.47
In the light of these goals, MiFID aims to reinforce the
existing best execution obligations of ISD with stronger
requirements and make them more homogeneous across all
European countries to make sure investment firms execute
orders in a way that provides best value for the client.48
(b) Relationship between the goals
MiFID does not discuss a priority of either investor
protection or market efficiency, but rather assumes that the
two are always compatible. It is obvious that this is not
necessarily so when one considers multiple clients that are
trading against each other. From a social perspective, it can
be desirable that trade occurs, eg because it induces greater
volume on the market, which in turn positively affects the
willingness of other agents to enter the market, making it
more liquid and ultimately more efficient. But protection of
individual interests might imply that trade should not occur
because each investor would be better off with execution on
a different market.
The solution to this conundrum is to recall what the
basic guiding principle of best execution is, namely to
minimise transaction costs, independent of whether a
particular transaction that is desired by two parties is in the
best interest of the parties. Best execution regulation can
only address one issue, namely transaction costs. It is true
that there is also the question of how to allow people
actually to make better choices on markets; however, one
should not – and cannot – expect one instrument to deliver
two goals at once.
There is also a second kind of conflict between the goals
of best execution that can be resolved with this sort of
approach. In particular, consider a “behavioural investor”, ie
an investor who is not behaving according to the same
principles as Homo oeconomicus. There is now a large amount
of evidence that individuals – “mom and pop” investors as
well as professional investors – suffer from cognitive biases,
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use rules of thumb, show regret and aversion to losses, etc.49
When such an investor sends an order to his broker, it is not
clear that, objectively speaking, this order is in the best
interest of the investor. It could be that adding this order
increases liquidity on the market and therefore has social
benefits, while actually hurting the welfare of the investor. In
principle, the answer to this question is straightforward: best
execution is not designed to solve the cognitive deficiencies
of investors; it is designed to allow investors who, for
whatever reason, have subjective preferences for a certain
trade to be implemented to achieve this goal in the best
possible way. In this sense, best execution is a formal
criterion, not a content criterion. This viewpoint also avoids
the problem that it would otherwise be possible and
desirable for investors to claim deviating “true” interests.
What matters is the will of the investor that is com-
municated at the time of the order. Summarising this
analysis, one way to interpret the goals of best execution
regulation is that it aspires to help minimising societal (not
only individual investor) transaction costs. It does so by
protecting investors within the range of their stated
preferences, and thus smoothing the functioning of markets,
but not by aiming to improve decisions made by individual
traders.
E. Scope and detailed requirements of the new
MiFID best execution rules
1. Basic considerations
The impact of the MiFID best execution rule is on invest-
ment firms:50 “Member States shall require that investment
firms take all reasonable steps to obtain, when executing
orders, the best possible result for their clients.”51 MiFID
applies to client orders in relation to financial instruments,
including fixed-income and over-the-counter (OTC)
(structured) products, thus extending the scope of products
covered compared to previous regulation. “Execution” is
defined reasonably broadly, but not extremely so. For
example, when an investment bank receives the mandate to
find a buyer for a company, this is not qualified as an order
to be best executed.52 In other words, MiFID proposes a
benefit–cost calculation: improving best execution for clients
yields additional benefits, but it also brings with it increased
cost for the investment firms. The general rule presented by
Article 21 MiFID does not provide a benchmark for what
“reasonable” steps are, but the spirit of MiFID seems to
suggest that the present level (ISD) of effort of many firms is
not yet sufficient. The FSA states that the new framework
established by Article 21 is therefore a reasonably high
level.53
2. Relevant aspects of best execution according to
MiFID
Welfare of investors giving orders to their brokers derives
from numerous factors. For individual investors, price at first
sight appears likely to be most important. (To be more
precise, it is price net of costs.) For quantitative and
professional traders, speed matters a lot. But things are not so
simple and clear cut. For example, a 2000 survey54 indicates
that 58 per cent of online investors value speed over price.
The reason for this high number is probably that people
wildly overestimate their trading ability or the degree of
private information they have. In particular, information is
short lived. Thus, if an investor has – or believes he has –
superior information, he will generally be less patient, and
fast execution becomes more important.55 Note that speed
also matters indirectly to retail investors even if they do not
possess private information themselves, because the fortunes
of investors’ funds may depend on it.
Accordingly, MiFID recognises as relevant factors the
price, cost, speed, likelihood of execution and settlement,
size, nature or any other consideration relevant to the
execution of the order.56 At the very least, these are the
criteria that need to be measured in order to be able to
verify the quality of execution. There is a basic match of
these criteria with the explicit and implicit transaction costs
listed earlier.
3.Criteria for determining the relative importance of
the factors
The flexibility offered by MiFID is both appealing and
challenging, on a theoretical and practical level. To see this,
consider two “execution vectors” with two elements (price
and speed) each. The only circumstance in which we can
unambiguously say that execution was better is when price
is lower and speed is faster in one of the two cases. For
example, one sale was executed at €15 within 1 minute,
while the other trade was executed at €14 within 90
seconds. In this case, the first trade clearly was better
executed. But this is rarely the case. A more likely scenario is
that, for example, one sale was executed at €15 within 1
minute, while the other trade was executed at €14.95 within
45 seconds. Thus, we must consider trade-offs. Empirically,
there seems to be a trade-off between price and speed, for
example, at least in US equities trading.57 A more subtle, but
also important type of trade-off exists between opportunity
costs and market impact. For example, splitting large orders
over time to reduce market impact can lead to larger
opportunity costs and vice versa.
Consistent with the idea that nobody knows which
factors are the most important in a particular case, MiFID
defines some general aspects according to which the trade-
off between factors can be defined. Article 21 paragraph 1 of
MiFID defines the following criteria for determining the
relative importance of the factors (price, costs, speed,
likelihood of execution and settlement, size, nature or any
other consideration relevant to the execution of the order)58
referred to above as “relevant factors”: (a) the characteristics
of the client, including the categorisation of the client as
retail or professional; (b) the characteristics of the client
order; (c) the characteristics of financial instruments that are
the subject of that order; (d) the characteristics of the
execution venues to which that order can be directed.59
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4. The central role of the execution policy
Summarising the previous two sections, we can see that the
system of MiFID is to (a) define relevant factors for best
execution (but not weigh them), and to (b) define relevant
characteristics for weighing the relevant factors (but not
weigh them either).
This system of governance is interesting from a theor-
etical point of view and quite reasonable from a practical
point of view. It posits that regulators at the European level
(and at a Member State level) know which factors matter,
but do not know how much they matter. Thus, MiFID
leaves some flexibility to investment firms in determining
the relative weighting of factors. But because the relevant
factors as well as the characteristics for weighing the relevant
factors are listed, investment firms need to specify how and
why certain characteristics matter in this or that way.
Investment firms have to be able to prove that they
considered both the factors and also the criteria for deter-
mining the relative importance of these factors.60 The tool
MiFID gives firms for documenting their views and
promised actions is the so-called “execution policy”. The
specification of the execution policy is perhaps the central
issue for investment firms. MiFID really concerns the
process by which an investment firm aims to achieve results
for its clients, not the actual outcomes.61
Investment firms are required to establish and implement
an order execution policy to allow them to obtain, for their
client orders, the best possible result. The order execution
policy shall include, in respect of each class of instruments,
information on the different venues where the investment
firm executes its client orders and the factors affecting the
choice of execution venue; it shall at least include those
venues that enable the investment firm to obtain on a
consistent basis the best possible result for the execution of
client orders. Investment firms have to provide appropriate
information to their clients about their order execution
policy and obtain the prior consent of their clients to the
execution policy.62 The implementing measures provide that
a firm also must disclose to retail clients the execution
venues in its execution policy on which it places “significant
reliance”.63 An important issue for firms is whether they can
satisfy MiFID requirements if their execution policy
includes just one execution venue or execution provider.64 It
is quite likely that firms can minimise execution costs by
doing so, because there may be volume discounts. Similarly,
choosing one affiliate firm for executing all client orders
would not appear to violate best execution requirements in
general. For example, in practice, a client (C) of a portfolio
manager (M) may be served best if the manager selects an
appropriate investment firm (F) for executing all his orders.
It seems reasonable to require that M retains competitive
offers every now and then, checking in detail to which
extent C would recognise F’s execution as “best execution”
if C dealt directly with F. Factors such as the size of the
market and the characteristics of the financial instruments
traded need to be taken into account in this consideration,
and no final statement can yet be made on the general
appropriateness of a regime with a single execution partner.
With these new rules, investment firms will formulate the
execution policy and reflect it in general terms and
conditions. The client has to consent to the execution policy
as well as to the possibility that his orders may be executed
outside a regulated market or a MTF.65 The client will in
reality usually be able to negotiate this contract. If he refuses
to sign, the investment firm will no longer accept him as a
client. In contrast to this, another point may be positive for
clients: unlike the existing regime (especially in the UK),
there is no longer any facility for contracting out of best
execution.66
Investment firms also have to monitor the effectiveness of
their order execution arrangements and execution policy in
order to identify and, where appropriate, correct any
deficiencies. In particular, they must assess, on a regular
basis,67 whether the execution venues included in the order
execution policy provide for the best possible result for the
client or if they need to make changes to their execution
arrangements. Investment firms have to notify clients of any
material changes to their order execution arrangements or
execution policy. Finally, investment firms have to be able to
demonstrate to their clients, at their request, that they have
executed their orders in accordance with the firm’s
execution policy.68
From an economic, incentives-based point of view, the
central challenge in implementing execution policies is how
to design them so that they are credible. Because transaction
cost indicators are numerous and subject to significant inter-
pretation problems (see Section E.6(b) below), achieving this
credibility is not trivial. A successful execution policy
explains how the indicators used to measure transaction
costs overcome the problems of noise in measurement and
bias in estimation. But there are not only technical issues.
Importantly, there are potential “gaming problems”, ie
problems arising out of the asymmetric information rampant
in this context. In particular, intermediaries may be able to
use their superior knowledge about the benchmark price
that will be used to measure transaction costs to the
disadvantage of clients by timing the trade accordingly.69
Establishing an execution policy alone may not be enough
to overcome the credibility challenge that these possibilities
pose. Instead, it is a matter of the general credibility of an
investment firm.
The bottom line of all of this analysis is that the
execution policy which documents how an investment firm
intends to create value for its customers will be an extremely
important factor in credibly communicating about execu-
tion quality.70 There is an interesting strategic interplay:
investment firms have an incentive to ensure that they
obtain execution quality sufficient to satisfy their clients – to
the extent that clients can recognise such quality. If the
execution policy shows clients which features are part of the
execution quality auditing, they will pay greater attention,
increasing the incentives for the investment firm to do so as
well. As such, specifying a demanding execution policy can
also provide an opportunity for investment firms to improve
their internal workings in the process of implementing
MiFID.71
In order to comply with the requirements of MiFID and
national implementing legislation, investment firms and
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other regulated entities may have to introduce new infor-
mation technology systems, new organisational structures,
and reporting and record-keeping procedures, or to make
significant modifications to existing systems and practices.
This can only be done once the contents of the implement-
ing measures to be adopted by the Commission and of the
national legislation transposing the Directive are settled.72
An active best execution policy should ensure that invest-
ment firms consider trading conditions on a range of trading
venues, and make use therefore of “smart” order-routing
techniques in order to seek out the best bargains for their
clients according to the policy.73
An important element of the provision of best execution
is the requirement that the investment firm regularly reviews
the procedures that it operates so as to obtain best execution
on behalf of its clients. The investment firm should
continually assess and update the arrangements which it
employs to execute client orders to ensure that they are
delivering the best possible result for client orders.74
The data that investment firms should record and report
naturally differ by order type. For market orders, descriptive
statistics include average price improvement and average
time to fill. (These data are especially informative when they
are classified by prevailing bid/ask spread, order size, security
size, etc). For limit orders, interesting statistics include fill rate
and time-to-fill distributions, classified by limit price
position. Classifications by prevailing bid–ask spread, order
size, primary listing market and time of submission prove
helpful. The information necessary to evaluate the effect of
cancellations should also be available.
That these statistics should be available is not asking too
much (for liquid markets in particular), particularly given the
requirements faced other industries. (For example, it is
standard that airlines must report their on-time perform-
ance.) As we have discussed earlier, only if all this
information is available will customers have a chance to
choose the service they want. Thus, it is in the interest of the
best executing firms to publish their statistics.
This is not the place to review transaction costs indicators
comprehensively. Edhec-Risk-Advisory75 provides a critical
analysis of some of the most popular indicators, including (1)
spread midpoint benchmarks (which are easy to implement
but which do not indicate whether the trade is well timed
and deliver poor insight into the quality of execution for
large orders completed through multiple trades); (2)
volume-weighted average price (which indicates whether
the trader received a higher or lower price than did the
average trader, but which is noisy, potentially biased (eg for
momentum traders), subject to gaming and particularly
uninformative if the trade being analysed is the dominant
trade in the measurement interval); (3) closing price
benchmark (which has the advantage that it cannot in
general be gamed, but which suffers from noisiness for trades
completed at the start of the day); (4) average of the lowest,
highest, opening and closing prices (which is common, but
ignores market depth and may include irrelevant reference
prices); and (5) implementation shortfall (which is the
primary method aimed at estimating implicit transaction
costs, but which requires a large amount of data and requires
a benchmark price which may be hard to determine).
Edhec-Risk-Advisory76 also presents an alternative method
which space does not permit us to review here.
An open question is the extent to which execution
policy will become a matter of competition between invest-
ment firms, or whether one single policy will be adopted by
virtually everyone. Only time will tell.77
5. Specific issues related to best execution
(a) OTC markets
Member States shall require that, where the order execution
policy provides for the possibility that client orders may be
executed outside a regulated market or an MTF, the
investment firm shall, inform its clients about this possibility.
Member States must require that investment firms obtain
the prior express consent of their clients before proceeding
to execute their orders outside a regulated market or an
MTF. Investment firms may obtain this consent either in the
form of a general agreement (execution policy) or in respect
of individual transactions.78 The Committee of European
Securities Regulators (CESR) is expected to amend its
previous consultation (level 3) on OTC markets soon; it
then remains to be seen how Member States react.79
(b) Customer instructions
Whenever there is a specific instruction from the client, the
investment firm shall execute the order following the spe-
cific instruction.80 Investment firms must in that case provide
retail clients (in good time prior to the provision of the
service) with a clear and prominent warning that any spe-
cific instructions from a client may prevent the firm from
taking the steps that it has designed and implemented in its
execution policy to obtain the best possible result for the
execution of those orders in respect of the elements covered
by those instructions.81
Client instructions are likely to address only some aspects
of execution. Even if a firm receives a specific client
instruction regarding, say, execution venue selection, that
firm would need to follow relevant provisions of its exe-
cution policy and agreements for those aspects of the
transaction that are not governed by the instruction.82
(c) Standards
The competent authority is not required to verify that the
investment firm obtains the best price in respect of all
transactions that it undertakes on behalf of clients. Instead,
the competent authority has to verify that the investment
firm operates procedures which maximise the probability of
its clients obtaining best execution having regard to the best
terms that are available at the different execution points that
make up the marketplace. This rule makes sense from an
economic point of view. An important aspect of a successful
provision will be to provide an indication of the conditions
under which an investment firm can be considered to have
undertaken reasonable endeavours to obtain best execution
on behalf of its client – notably by ensuring that it has access
to a sufficient range of the venues which consistently deliver
best execution.83
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F. Implementation of the MiFID best execution
requirements
1. Process of implementation
Originally it was planned that national legislators would be
required to implement MiFID by 31 January 2007, whereas
investment firms would be obliged to apply the Directive by
1 November 2007.
In April 2006, the European Parliament implemented a
Directive to shift certain deadlines for the national adoption
of MiFID.84 The Parliament states in that directive the
following: given the postponed deadline between the
obligation for Member States to transpose MiFID into
national law and the deadline for investment firms and credit
institutions to comply with the new requirements, the
provisions of MiFID will remain ineffective until 1
November 2007.85
In its work programme published in December 2006, the
CESR (Level 386 of the Lamfalussy procedure) sets out its
immediate priorities; these also include best execution.
Papers on best execution are planned for publication. CESR
is aiming to reach conclusions on all of these pieces of work.
In February the CESR published a consultation paper,
which was discussed at an open hearing on 7 March 2007.87
The consultation was closed on 16 March 2007, but the
results of the consultation are not yet published.
2. Preparations for implementation in countries
With the examples of the UK, Germany and France, we can
see how the EU Member States have started to plan the
conversion of the MiFID regulations with special regard to
the best execution conversion.
(a) UK
In May 2006, the Treasury and FSA jointly published an
implementation plan for the MiFID. This plan sets out the
approach to, and programme for, consulting on and making
the necessary changes to the Financial Services and Markets
Act (FSMA) and its secondary legislation, as well as the FSA
Handbook, to meet the transposition deadline. That
consultation programme was complete in January 2007 and
the necessary changes to FSMA and its secondary legislation,
and to the FSA Handbook, to deliver transposition had been
made.88
The proposed approach (“key issues”) to the trans-
position of the MiFID by the FSA was: to intelligently copy
out the relevant MiFID requirements; to remove existing
provisions that were, as a consequence, inconsistent, con-
sidered redundant or unnecessarily prescriptive – reflecting
the move towards more principles-based regulation; to be
sparing in the use of guidance; and to retain or add other
requirements beyond the MiFID minimum only where
necessary for delivery of UK statutory market confidence
and consumer protection objectives, where justified in their
own right (including on grounds of a suitable cost–benefit
analysis), and where permissible under the terms of the
Directive – including, where relevant, Article 4 of the Level
2 Implementing Directive.89
The FSA published a Discussion Paper (DP) on MiFID’s
best execution requirements in May 200690 and a policy
statement in January 2007,91 which also deals in detail with
best execution.92 Many firms, trade associations and other
interested parties have provided detailed responses to the DP,
commenting on the issues discussed in the DP and raising a
myriad of other issues. The FSA has taken this feedback into
account and it will also continue discussions with stake-
holders about more specific issues of implementation. The
FSA intended to delete all the existing COB requirements
and replace them in NEWCOB with “intelligent copy out”
of the MiFID text. There are no proposals to apply these
requirements to any business other than MiFID business.93
The FSA will review its implementation approach on best
execution once the outcome of CESR (level 3) is known.94
(b) Germany
The Federal Department of Finance published in September
2006 a draft95 for the conversion of MiFID, which trans-
forms the rules of MiFID in large parts one to one. The
legislative procedure was finished in March 2007.96 The
German Bundestag concluded the act on 29 March 2007,
and finally discussions on this by the Bundesrat are due to
take place in May 2007.97
The implementation of MiFID by the financial market
conversion law will considerably change German banking,
stock exchange and capital market law.98 The German
legislator is planning not only to implement the Directive,
but it is also envisaged to change certain information require-
ments with regard to forward transactions at the same time.99
The rules of best execution are stated in paragraph 33a of
the changed securities trading law.100
The German Stock Exchange in Frankfurt implemented
several steps to ensure best execution compliant with MiFID
for investment firms trading with “Xetra BEST”.101 The
stock exchange in Stuttgart also published a manual about
best execution containing their measures to fulfil the new
MiFID rules.102
(c) France
In July 2006, L’Autorité des marchés financiers (AMF)
published a consultation paper on enforcing the best execu-
tion principles in MiFID and its implementing directive.103
The framework stemming from MiFID is similar to the
general principles embodied in the AMF General
Regulation, but MiFID sets rules that are far more detailed
than the existing provision of the AMF General Regulation
on the same subject.
The AMF has made the “better regulation” approach
recommended by the EC a central goal of its rule-making
policy for the years ahead. Accordingly, when it transposes
MiFID into its General Regulation, the AMF ensures that
the European rules are incorporated as faithfully as possible
into the French regulatory corpus.104
The AMF’s paper on interpreting the best execution rule,
which was put out to consultation in July 2006, will be
finalised in the context of CESR-led work (level 3). The
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AMF additionally launched a consultation on draft amend-
ments to Book V (Market Infrastructures) of its General
Regulation with a view to transposing MiFID in delay.105
G. Some aspects of the relation to non-Member
States
We cannot comprehensively discuss the implication of
MiFID’s rules for non-Member States. However, we wish to
highlight a few aspects for Switzerland and the US.
1. Switzerland
As a non-EU Member State, Switzerland is not legally
required to modify its laws, regulations and administrative
provisions to comply with MiFID. However, some Swiss
Institutions may see benefits of becoming MiFID compliant
because of competitive market pressures, even if they do not
offer cross-border services according to MiFID’s scope and
do not fall under EU regulation from a formal legal
perspective. For that reason, MiFID will not be without
influence for the Swiss finance community.106
In particular, European-wide and globally acting Swiss
banks and investment firms formed working groups in order
to evaluate the effects of MiFID for their institute and to
conclude appropriate measures. UBS, for example, does not
plan a complete conversion of the MiFID rules, but they
want to be ready with some adjustments for MiFID by
November 2007. They see the conversion particularly as an
IT problem with regard to smart order routing technologies.
The largest Swiss bank sees also business chances due to the
new rules in the European bank industry.107 Another very
important point for Swiss banks is the question of liability.
The banks should validate and adjust internal processes and
record every contact with the client to have proof in case of
a liability lawsuit.108
Furthermore, the Swiss Federal Banking Commission109
built a taskforce to analyse the new MiFID rules and their
impact on Swiss firms.110 They also held conversations with
the Swiss Bankers Association, SWX Swiss Exchange and
the national fiscal department to these developments. The
Banking Commission wants to strengthen exchange of
views with the market participants in Switzerland and in
Europe. It continues to pursue the developments of Europe
and examine the need for possible regulatory action. The
Banking Commission is very interested in the latest
developments in Europe and so, in Autumn 2006, a meeting
took place in Paris between the CESR and the Swiss
Banking Commission at which it was agreed to continue
the dialogue between these two parties annually.111 The
Banking Commission has not yet published results of the
work in the taskforce.
The Swiss Bankers Association112 also formed a working
group to analyse impacts, chances and risks of MiFID for
Swiss banks. The working group suggests that banks and
especially Swiss politicians are waiting for the final
conversion of MiFID in European countries before getting
active.113
2. United States of America
It is possible that a number of the US (and also
non-European) investment banks may decide to sell off their
European business to European banks that will have
expended considerable effort to comply with MiFID.114 On
the other hand, 60 per cent of US investment firms are using
or experimenting with algorithmic trading. Algorithmic
trading is a logical extension of rules-based trading – it is
just that over the last five years, the rules deployed by
execution agents have become increasingly sophisticated.115
In that sense, the investment firms would be ready to adapt
new rules (like best execution in MiFID) relatively easily.
The US Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) has
a MiFID-like approach to best execution and formally
approved in June 2005 the Regulation National Market
System (NMS).116 Scheduled to be fully implemented (like
MiFID) by November 2007, these new rules are designed to
strengthen and modernise the regulatory structure of US
equity markets. In particular, they are intended to provide
better transparency and consistent access to market and
offers regardless of trading centre.117
According to meet appropriate measures, big US investment
firms with adequate resources would like the big Swiss
banks to check what influence MiFID could have on their
businesses, especially with Europe, and therefore check with
working groups which measures would be appropriate
concerning the new European regime.
H. Concluding remarks
The best execution obligation under MiFID is governed by
three major principles:
1. an obligation of establishing means of usually achieving
the best net result for the client;
2. documentation of an execution policy that includes the
execution venues and documentation of the parameters
that justify these choices;
3. an obligation for investment firms to demonstrate, at the
demand of the client, that execution has been carried
out in accordance with the agreed execution policy and
that the execution policy allows achievement of the best
possible result on a consistent basis.
All three parts indicate that best execution is a process-based
requirement for firms.
In interpreting these basic principles, we have adopted a
law and economics analysis. While investor protection is a
central motivation for MiFID, the analysis reveals that, in
many cases at least, effective investor protection will also
have positive externalities on the functioning of markets. In
particular, better execution requirements are likely to result
in a reduction in total implicit transaction costs. Of course,
achieving this goal can be costly, and it seems surprising that
little analysis is available that rigorously compares the social
benefits with the total costs of implementing the new
requirements. It is true that MiFID is likely to help the
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European Union single market take another step forward,
and one is inclined to believe in the overall positive net
present value of the project. Nonetheless, it would appear
prudent in future regulatory attempts to begin with a
standard, best-practice benefit–cost analysis. In policy-
making, that would be best execution. 
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